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his issue of EAP begins our 15th year. We 
thank the 61 readers who have renewed their 
subscriptions and include reminders for 
those who have not yet renewed. 
 This issue begins with a review of Patterns of 
Home, a new book by architects Max Jacobson, 
Murray Silverstein, and Barbara Winslow. Next, 
educator John Cameron considers philosopher’s J. 
E. Malpas’ Place and Experience as it has signifi-
cance for environmental ethics and place education. 
Finally, architect David Wang draws on the philoso-
phers Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Immanuel Kant 
to explore the nature of artistic creativity.  
 
Enhanced EAP Website 
Thanks to Kansas State University computer sci-
ence graduate student Nagini Indugula, our EAP 
website has been updated and substantially en-
hanced. The cumulative index is now complete 
through 2003, and we have added webpage versions 
of many essays and book reviews from past issues. 
Also provided is a comprehensive review, by EAP 
editor David Seamon, of recent phenomenological 
and related qualitative research dealing with envi-




     
                SQUARE HOUSE       LONG THIN HOUSE     HOUSE WITH WINGS 
 
 
 Above: Conceptual drawings from Patterns of Home by Max Jacobson, Murray Silverstein, & Barbara Wins-
low (Newtown, CT: Taunton Press, 2002, p. 102). Arguing that light coming into rooms from two sides is inte-
gral to good house design, the authors describe simple ways to incorporate this element architecturally. Left, a 
simple four-square house allowing light into two sides of each corner room; center, a long thin house, allowing 
light to enter from opposite sides of most rooms; and, right, a house with wings creating rooms with the poten-









We are grateful to the following readers who have 
contributed more than the base subscription for 
2004. Our membership is fragile, and we could not 
continue without your support. Thank you all. 
 
David Adams    Camille Archer 
Tom Barrie    Aina Barten 
Alfred Bay    Rosemarie Bogner 
Roxanne Bok    Margaret Boschetti 
Andrew Cohill    Pam Cole 
L. J. Evenden    Eduard Führ 
Kirk Gastinger    Marie Gee 
Gus Glaser    Sara Isakawa  
Jim Jones     Michael Kazanjian 
David Kermani    Evelyn Koblentz 
Ted Lowitz    Mark Miller 
Ricardo Nemirovsky   Shierry Nicholson 
Marina Pecar    Martha Perez 
Carolyn Prorok    Miles Richardson 
Mark Rosenbaum   Tom Saarinen 
David Saile    R. Murray Schafer 
Harvey Sherman   Ray Weisenburger 
Anthony Weston   Justin Winkler 
 
Items of Interest 
The seminar, “Radical Prince: The Integral Vi-
sion of HRH the Prince of Wales,” will be held 1-
14 March 2004, at Frenchman’s Cove, Port Antonio, 
Jamaica. The seminar will include a focus on Prince 
Charles’ continuing interest in architecture, includ-
ing Christopher Alexander’s work. Writer and phi-
losopher David Lorimer will lead the seminar, held 
on a private estate located on the northeast coast of 
Jamaica. Contact: lainnes@gonuts4free.com. 
 
Interdisciplinary Environmental Review is an in-
ternational journal that publishes research and sur-
vey papers, from all disciplines, concerning the 
natural environment. The journal is sponsored by 
the Interdisciplinary Environmental Association, 
whose mission is to “bring together all disciplines 
so that our understanding of environmental issues is 
enhanced through interdisciplinary communica-
tion.” Contact: Prof. Kevin Hickey, Economics 
Dept., Assumption College, 500 Salisbury St., 
Worcester, MA 01609; khickey@assumption.edu. 
 
Janus Head, an on-line and paper journal published 
twice a year, is devoted to “maintaining an attitude 
of respect and openness to the various manifesta-
tions of truth in human experience; it strives to fos-
ter understanding through meditative thinking, nar-
rative structure, and poetic imagination.  Like the 
Janus head reliefs found over the doorways of old 
Roman homes, this journal, too, is situated at a 
threshold. The space within this journal, like the 
space beyond the Janus head relief, is a space where 
dwelling can occur, where thinking can take place, 
and where community can be built.” .P.O. Box 




Chicago Architect Mark Miller recently presented 
a talk on “Zen in the Art of Architecture” for the 
lecture series, “The Emerging Horizon,” sponsored 
by the AIA Chicago Health Professional Interest 
Area. A major issue that he addressed was whether 
the Eastern philosophies that underpin many alter-
native medical therapies can be integrated into ar-
chitecture itself. mark@zenplusarchitecture.com. 
 
Ray Weisenburger, Professor of Planning and Ar-
chitecture at Kansas State University, writes: “I sub-
scribe to about ten journals and receive another 20 
or so that are free—some very good ones. However, 
your journal is the only one I read from cover to 
cover. I particularly liked the recent “Travel Draw-
ing” article, although drawing is not a recreational 
activity in my mind. My Urban Visual Analysis 
class focuses on drawing as a way to understand the 
structure and content of a community or neighbor-
hood—not just to put a “picture” in our 
sketchbooks. Later on the author says may things I 
agree with. Keep up the good work.” rbw@ksu.edu 
 
University of Michigan School of Art & Design’s 
Jack Williamson sends news of Design Biz, a web-
based educational initiative that brings together 
businesspeople, designers, and students interested in 
the ways that good design can help and be helped 
by business. A summary of the work is provided in 
DesigninBuz: Furthering the Synergy between 
Business and Design—a Model for Community 
Building on the Web. To receive a copy, contact Wil-
liamson at: jhwill@umich.edu. 
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Max Jacobson, Murray Silverstein, & Barbara Winslow, 2002. Patterns of Home: The Ten Es-
sentials of Enduring Design. Taunton, CT: Taunton Press. 
 
 
uthors of the earlier The Good House: Con-
trast as a Design Tool [Taunton Press, 
1990; reviewed in EAP, fall 1991], These 
three architects aim in this useful new book to iden-
tify and to illustrate the central qualities that make a 
house “a truly wonderful place to live” (p. 3). 
 
After designing many houses themselves and 
analyzing other home designs that are “memorable, 
satisfying, and enduring” (p. 8), the authors arrive at 
ten patterns that they claim underlie and sustain a 
thorough sense of at-homeness. These patterns, 
summarized in the box, next page, are said to: 
 
link the way the house is designed with the way we experience 
the world. They explore the presence of light, the way we 
move through a space, the feel of one space as you are sitting 
in another, the relationship of indoors and outdoors (p. 9). 
 
After an introductory chapter overviewing the 
ten patterns and discussing how they were estab-
lished and how they might be used practically, the 
authors elaborate the patterns in ten chapters well 
illustrated with built examples taken from the au-
thors’ own architectural practice or from the home 
designs of other architects. 
Each chapter presents a pattern in broad terms, 
then identifies several practical ways in which that 
pattern can be designed for and grounded architec-
turally. For instance, in the chapter on “capturing 
light,” the authors emphasize design elements that 
include the following: 
• Locating the house on its site so that the build-
ing receives light throughout the day; 
• Shaping the house so that light can enter impor-
tant rooms from at least two sides; 
• Using light from skylights or clerestories when 
light from a second side is not possible; 
• Placing rooms in such a way that they receive 
light at the time of day when most important ac-
tivities occur there; 
• Shaping each opening to suit the climate and 
activities that will be lit by the opening; 
• Creating window places like bays and window 
seats to enhance the life of the house; 
• Using shading devices to control the light and 
heat entering the house. 
 
For example, in regard to allowing light in each 
room from two sides, the drawings on this EAP’s 
front page illustrate some possibilities for differ-
ently shaped houses—the rectangular house, for 
which each corner room has the potential for win-
dows on two sides; or the long thin house or house 
with long wings, both house forms affording the 
possibility of windows on opposite walls. 
 
Commentary 
From a phenomenological perspective, perhaps the 
most valuable aspect of Patterns is the authors’ ef-
fort to hold tight to the lived relationship between 
people and world as, in this case, that relationship 
infuses,  through  house  and  home,  an experience 
of centeredness, contentment, and deep personal 
and family identity. 
If one accepts the central phenomenological 
principle that home, working rightly, resolves a se-
ries of lived dialectics like rest/movement, cen-
ter/horizon, dwelling/journey, inside/outside, and 
privacy/publicness, then one can say that all ten pat-
terns contribute in some fashion toward resolution 
through the participation and support of the built 
world—viz., a well designed house. 
For example, “creating rooms,” “sheltering 
roof,” and “private edges, common core” all help to 
establish and enhance a sense of center and rest so 
that the individual, couple, or family  unit can iden-
tify, remember, and strengthen their sense of at-
homeness and selfhood. On the other hand, the pat-
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pect” do more to mediate the centering quality of 
home with its larger context of natural setting, 
neighborhood, natural landscape, and views. 
Yet again, patterns like “capturing light,” “parts 
in proportion,” “places in between,” and “compos-
ing with materials” work more like a physical and 
aesthetic bond that holds the home’s centering and 
reaching qualities together, making them a built and 
lived whole that contributes architecturally to the 
continual, lived resolution of home’s inescapable 
dialectical nature. In short, good design, through the 
reconciling potential of the patterns, can help re-
solve home’s lived dialectics and transform an un-
avoidable “struggle” of opposites into lived rela-
tionship. House becomes home and environment 
becomes place. 
As this newsletter has regularly argued, too 
much of the phenomenological research on place 
and human dwelling emphasizes the person aspect 
of the person-world relationship with little aware-
ness or concern with how the world—particularly 
its physical and built dimensions—also plays a cru-
cial role in shaping lifeworld and place. Patterns is 
important because it gives most  attention to these 
environmental and built qualities and thus helps 
demonstrate how they constitute an integral part of 
what the world as lived is about. 
One critical concern I have about the book is 
how directly, in the houses illustrated, the architects 
have actually used the patterns in the house designs. 
Some of the homes chosen are the authors’ own 
work, which indicates a direct use of the patterns in 
the design process. By far, however, the over 30 
houses providing pattern illustrations are the work 
of other architects who more than likely had no di-
rect notion of “patterns” and no doubt designed 
their houses in the typical formalist-visual way that 
dominates architectural practice today. If the idea of 
patterns was not used in designing these houses, is it 
really that useful a design tool? 
At the same time, one wishes that the authors 
might have included at least a few examples of 
houses poorly designed from the vantage point of 
the ten patterns and then considered whether these 
patterns really help demonstrate why the houses 
work badly as homes. 
There is also a question concerning the many 
house photographs, which are beautiful aesthetically 
 
The Ten Essential Patterns 
 
1. Inhabiting the site 
Think of the house and its site as a single thing but 
also as parts shaped by a larger environment. 
 
2. Creating rooms, outside and in 
Buildings give shape to their interior spaces but also 
to the exterior spaces around them. 
 
3. Sheltering roof 
One of the defining comforts of home is the feeling 
of being enveloped by a simple, sloping roof. 
 
4. Capturing light 
A home must open itself to the light and warmth of 
the sun. 
 
5. Parts in proportion 
A home is an assembly of parts, materials, and 
spaces. In some graceful, rhythmic way, these parts 
must make an orderly and sensible whole. 
 
6. The flow through rooms 
How we arrive on a site and enter the house and 
move through it has a profound influence on our 
sense of the building as home. 
 
7. Private edges, common core 
Against the flow of movement, rooms are meant to 
hold activity, to gather the life of the home. 
 
8. Refuge and outlook 
One of the abiding pleasures that home offers is be-
ing in and looking out—providing a solid, stable, and 
protected place from which you can look out toward 
and over a larger “beyond.” 
 
9. Places in between 
The house needs places where one can pause, leave 
the mainstream, enjoy quiet eddies along the margins. 
 
10. Composing with materials 
Envision a melody—materials that support and un-
derscore; those that offer counterpoint, slow the pro-
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and appear like the standard stunning illustrations 
that one finds in glossy architectural magazines and 
journals—a portrayal of houses that are perfectly 
ordered and with few indications that real people 
actually live in these places and transform them into 




Two of the book’s authors worked with Christo-
pher Alexander to write the original 1977 Pattern 
Language  and, in this regard, it is instructive to set 
Patterns next to the recently-published second vol-
ume of Alexander’s Nature of Order (The Process 
of Making Life, Berkeley, CA: Center for Environ-
mental Structure, 2002). Few if any of the several 
house designs that Alexander illustrates in that work 
have the formalistic perfection or magazine ele-
gance of the houses illustrated in Patterns. In fact, 
most of Alexander’s house designs appear down-
right crude and filled with an awkwardness, both 
architectural and lived, that Alexander calls “rough-
ness”—a kind of intentional inexactitude that he 
claims contributes to the life and wholeness of the 
design. 
There is little of this roughness in the houses 
displayed in Patterns and that is not necessarily a 
weakness, though we are given very little evidence 
to know if the patterns illustrated in the houses ac-
tually evoke, in the daily lives of the occupants, the 
kinds of environmental experiences claimed by the 
patterns.  
In short, one would like to know how at least a 
few of these houses really work as physical contexts 
for human worlds and whether the built parts arise 
from and evoke the patterns with which they are 
identified. 
This concern, however, is the quibble of a phe-
nomenologist who believes that, eventually, any 
presentation arguing a link between human and 
built worlds must verify that link in terms of real 
peoples’ doings in real built environments. 
As architects, these authors have done more 
than enough by providing a valuable house-making 
tool that should motivate both lay people and de-
signers to better envision homes that are places of 
life, graciousness, and comfort. 
Particularly, the book should be considered as a 
required text in lower-level architectural studios, 
where students are too often subjected to a design 
pedagogy that reduces place making to sterile, aes-





Some Implications of Malpas’ Place and 
Experience  for Place Ethics and Education 
 
John I. Cameron 
  
Cameron is a faculty member in the program in Social Ecology at the University of Western Sydney. This com-
mentary is based on excerpts from a longer article, “Educating for Place Responsiveness: An Australian Per-
spective on Ethical Practice,” to be published later this year in the academic journal Ethics, Place and Envi-
ronment. j.cameron@uws.edu.au. © 2004 John I. Cameron. 
 
 
 E. Malpas’ Place and Experience (Malpas 
1999) is part of a renewal of attention to the 
subject of place by philosophers (Casey 1993, 
1997) and, more recently, by writers on environ-
mental ethics (Stefanovic 2000, Smith 2001). 
I had occasion to review Malpas’ work while re-
flecting upon the ethical and educational implica-
tions of place-responsiveness work I have been un-
dertaking in Australia. By “place-responsive,” I 
mean a society whose institutions and customs nur-
ture and support a rich, deep connection with land 
and place (Cameron 2001; Plumwood 2000). 
J 
As an educator committed to the goal of moving 
towards a place-responsive society, I have been ac-
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tively involved in engendering place responsiveness 
with university students, conference participants, 
and other members of the public. Through running 
experientially-oriented courses on sense of place, 
national colloquia on place, and researching with 
local community members, I have sought to foster 
an inclusive love of place as a deep motivation for 
an environmental ethic. 
Coming into this work from a conservationist 
background and being motivated by a strong envi-
ronmental ethic has sometimes been a challenge. It 
has led to three major questions of ethical practice: 
 
• Does it generate positive environmental and so-
cial outcomes? 
• How to bring depth experience and critical think-
ing together? 
• How to engage with indigenous knowledge? 
 
The philosophical topography traversed by Mal-
pas, especially when considered in combination with 
Stefanovic’s (2000) place-based ethics, has helped me 
think about these questions constructively. 
 
Place and Experience 
In Place and Experience, Malpas (1999) does not 
mention directly the word ‘ethics’, but makes such a 
thorough investigation of the philosophy of place 
from first principles that it provides a substantial 
basis for examination of my place responsiveness 
work. 
Malpas contends that much writing about place 
misses the point by effectively describing place as 
human response to physical surroundings as distinct 
from mere location in objective space. In books 
such as Tuan’s Topophilia (1974), ‘it is not place as 
such that is important, but just the idea of human 
responsiveness – a responsiveness that need not it-
self be grounded in any concept of place or locality 
at all’ (Malpas, 1999, p. 30). I have encountered this 
phenomenon also in those students who lost sight of 
the place itself in the intensity of the personal ex-
periences the encounter with place triggered. 
The best way to describe the relationship be-
tween place and experience, Malpas suggests, is not 
to talk of the experience of place as if place were 
one of a number of things that could be experi-
enced, but that it is the complex structure of place 
itself that makes experience, any human experience, 
possible at all. 
He carefully maps this structure of place by 
surveying the interconnected elements that are con-
tained within it – objective and subjective space, 
self-subjectivity and other-subjectivity, memory and 
mental states (thoughts, feelings, experiences), ac-
tion and narrative. He draws out the structural inter-
dependencies of all these elements within place, for 
example, how memories are nested within each 
other the way places are nested within other places 
with multiple and overlapping connections. 
Neither objective nor subjective space can be 
grasped without the possibility of the other, and 
both are required for the intersubjective space 
opened up between two people encountering the 
same object. The narrative structuring of mental 
states constitutes the self and the possibility of 
agency. Actions are nested in personal projects that 
are nested in larger narratives that structure place 
and are structured by place. As a result:  
 
To have a sense of one’s own identity….is to have a sense, not 
of some simple underlying self that is one’s own, but rather of 
a particular place in the world. While the having of such a 
sense of place consists in having a grasp of a conceptually 
complex structure – a structure that encompasses different 
forms of spatiality, concepts of self, of others and of an objec-
tive order of things – it is also a sense of place that is necessar-
ily articulated linguistically (p. 152). 
 
While Malpas notes in conclusion that he has 
not directly discussed the practical, moral, and po-
litical implications of his work, he has provided a 
framework within which they might be considered. 
For example, he suggests that ‘the complex struc-
ture of place…..suggest[s] that the idea of place 
does not so much bring a certain politics with it, as 
define the very frame within which the political it-
self must be located’ (p. 198). If we substitute ‘eth-
ics’ for ‘politics’ in that sentence, it reads just as sat-
isfactorily as a basis for rethinking ethics. 
Malpas’ exposition of the complex structure of 
place itself illuminates why rediscovering childhood 
sense of place became important for my students. 
Childhood memories of place are not merely an in-
teresting side issue, far less to be dismissed as nos-
talgia. They are critical to self-identity, to the narra-
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tives we develop about our lives, and to our capac-
ity for self-reflection (pp 182-183). 
Malpas also notes that as we age, such places 
and memories become increasingly significant to 
us, according to psychological studies of autobio-
graphical memory. It may be no coincidence that 
most of my students and members of the collo-
quium are mature-aged, often in their forties or fif-
ties, and it suggests that education for place respon-
siveness should prioritize work with childhood 
place memories, especially when working with ma-
ture-aged people. 
Malpas’ emphasis on the primacy of narrative 
in structuring experiences, a sense of self, taking 
action in the world, and place itself provides a phi-
losophical foundation for working with story in 
place education (Cameron, Mulligan & Wheatly 
2003; Hay 2001; Mulligan 2003). In addition to 
validating my use of ‘a storied sense of place’ in 
classes and workshops, his work suggests the value 
of exploring the interconnections between self, 
place, and action. 
It is not simply a matter of place containing and 
being structured by stories – our very sense of who 
we are as individuals is a narrative connected inti-
mately with place, Malpas says, and the possibility 
of our being able to take action is structured by nar-
rative and place. Thus there may be value in en-
couraging students to consider notions of selfhood 
and capacity for action in narrative terms, and then 
relate those stories to significant places in their lives 
– something that some of them have done already.  
More generally for education, Malpas’ work 
suggests that whatever else place education does, it 
must begin to draw out the consequences of place 
being the structure that enables any human experi-
encing to occur. Place education becomes broad-
ened and deepened by the understanding that com-
ing to terms with the structures of our dwelling 
places, past and present, enables us to grasp how we 
structure our lives and sense of ourselves, as indi-
viduals and as members of a culture. 
As Malpas’ critique of Tuan implies, it is not 
enough to treat place as a vehicle for developing 
human responsiveness – the ability to listen, to en-
gage deeply in relationship with other beings, to 
open the imagination and all the physical senses to 
another, and so on. 
These abilities can be cultivated in a variety of 
ways, and it is a worthy thing to do, but it’s only 
half the battle. The other half is to acknowledge the 
particular quality of the structure of place; any 
place, that is, and not just special sites. The chal-
lenge, perhaps, is to give practical expression to the 
view that the idea of place redefines the very frame 
within which education itself must be located. 
 
Towards an Ethic of Place 
Malpas’ work, viewed in this way, might provide a 
philosophical grounding for Ingrid Stefanovic’s 
(2000) place-based ethics that was recently re-
viewed in this newsletter by Kenneth Maly (2001). 
She is one of several recent writers who have ex-
plicitly considered what an ethics of place or a phi-
losophy of place and experience might be (Callicott 
1994; Fox 1990; Plumwood 1003, 2002; Salleh 
1997; Singer 1975). 
In rethinking sustainability, Stefanovic intro-
duces the notion of ‘place’ into environmental eth-
ics. She arrives at a place-based ethic that ‘aims to 
guide us in our actions, not through the imposition 
of static principles and rules, but instead by teach-
ing the meaning of attunement to a balanced fitting 
relation between human beings and their world’ (p. 
117). This ethic ‘respects the bonds that tie us to our 
dwelling places but [is] one that allows for continu-
ing dialogue as we collectively reflect on environ-
mental questions of right and wrong’ (p. 135). 
Because I have journeyed through environmen-
talism to the phenomenology of place, I am particu-
larly interested in Stefanovic’s attempt to bring 
phenomenology to environmental ethics. It is note-
worthy that she advocates an ethic that provides 
guidance through teaching the meaning of attune-
ment and right relationship with the world. 
She establishes the centrality of educational 
processes in a place-based ethics, and thus demon-
strates the significance of place responsiveness 
work for an understanding of what an ethics of 
place might be in practice. She includes a section on 
phenomenology and environmental education that 
considers how to promote grounded ecological val-
ues, and takes up the relationship between critical 
thinking and place awareness. 
7




In his review of Stefanovic’s book, Maly 
(2001) draws out the tension in her work between 
attunement to being-in-place and environmental 
questions of right and wrong. Calling for an ethic to 
do both these things might be considered to be 
glossing over the inherent difficulties, except for the 
fact that Stefanovic provided specific examples of 
how this might be done. 
Her third case study is particularly informative 
and describes involving the community of Short 
Hills Park in developing a ‘bottom-up’ environ-
mental code of ethics for the park. She discusses her 
role as a phenomenologist in drawing out converg-
ing images of the park as well as critically analysing 
the value-laden and conflicting claims of partici-
pants. She concludes that: 
 
the iterative process of evolving a code of ethics for Short 
Hills Park does suggest the possibility that ethics is neither a 
linear product of philosophical theorizing nor merely a socio-
logical accumulation of viewpoints. Rather, what emerged on 
this project was a role for philosophy of mediating between 
concrete place-based needs and critical thinking about the 
broader implications of how best to collectively reconcile 
those needs (p 169-170). 
 
If the place-based needs are understood to arise 
from attunement to being-in-place, and the need for 
mediation stems out of critical thinking about dif-
ferent experiences and values regarding the park, 
then Stefanovic is working with the same dynamic 
between experience and critical awareness that I 
have been raising. 
It is interesting to note that it is not a simple 
oppositional dynamic. As her discussion of educa-
tion reveals, critical thinking about taken-for-
granted experience is required in order for students 
to move beyond the ‘natural attitude’. That is, depth 
experience and critical awareness are in creative 
tension, sometimes necessary for each other, some-
times apparently pulling students in different direc-
tions. Stefanovic’s case study provides an example 
of how to work with this tension in a practical ethi-
cal setting. 
It is significant that it was an iterative process, 
requiring the moving back and forth between identi-
fying images and needs and reflecting upon emerg-
ing conflicts. It also was a mediated activity, neces-
sitating someone outside the immediate community 
being able to hold the power of people’s experi-
ences and expressed needs as well as the conflict. 
The latter confirms our experience in the local re-
search and the colloquia, and the former is a valu-
able addition to the criteria for successful place-
based processes.  
 
Narratives of Place 
 Narrative emerges from this discussion as a ‘central 
organizing principle’ of place and identity, although 
as Malpas reminds us, place both structures and is 
structured by narrative. The narratives that are em-
bedded in a culture’s landscapes and memory can be 
viewed both as stories that connect us and stories 
that make us different. Each point of view is helpful 
in breaking down the potential for local place rela-
tionships to be devalued by the experience of ex-
traordinary places that appear to have their own 
special characteristics. 
The fact that all places and all cultures have 
their narratives (about how country came into being 
and is maintained, how humans and non-humans are 
related, how conflicts are resolved, and so on) might 
be a starting point for a discussion about which nar-
ratives are dominant and why, and whether new nar-
ratives can be enacted. 
Critical environmental and social awareness is 
clearly important to an ethical process that can oc-
cur at many different levels, from a code of ethics 
for a local park to national debates on reconciliation 
and place – which of the stories we tell ourselves 
and implicitly live by, or would like to live by, are 
more likely to lead to ecological sustainability and 
the flourishing of difference? 
The central role for place education in any 
movement towards a sustainable society has been 
well established by Stefanovic. The tension in edu-
cational practice between facilitation of deep place 
experiences and reflecting upon them while main-
taining critical awareness of their broader environ-
mental and social implications, proves to be a sig-
nificant and creative tension in the emerging field of 
place ethics. 
Individual and collective learning need to take 
place, from experience and critical awareness of the 
structural issues, and both have to be included in an 
ethical place education. 
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A way forward is suggested by Stefanovic’s 
mediated iterative process for group work and the 
suspension of outcome orientation and judgment to 
allow the experience to speak for itself prior to 
critical reflection for individual work. 
Malpas observes that it is insufficient to use 
place experiences in an education for general hu-
man responsiveness. By implication, a genuine, 
ethical place education must enable students to 
learn the ways in which place itself makes human 
experience possible. A starting point is to accord 
childhood place memories greater significance in 
educational development and self-understanding. 
An equally important step is to make more con-
scious those personal and cultural narratives that 
often subconsciously structure our sense of personal 
identity and sense of place. Such educational initia-
tives, like the practical experience of philosophers 
such as Stefanovic with local park residents, will 
assist in working through what an ethics of place 
might be in practice. 
This review of Malpas’ work and its connection 
with Stefanovic’s research has focused only on its 
implications for place ethics and education. If in-
deed it is the complex structuring of place itself that 
makes any human experience possible at all, the 
implications for all fields of human endeavour are 
profound. This is not a simple deterministic view 
that we are creatures of place, but an understanding 
of the structural interdependencies of subjectivity, 
experience, memory and action within place. 
It is something to become aware of, not to be 
taken for granted. What we do with—and in—the 
places within which we dwell and raise our children 
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aurice Merleau-Ponty’s essay “Cezanne’s 
Doubt” details the struggles of an artist 
striving to produce a genuine and authen-
tic art. Cezanne says, “the landscape thinks itself 
through me … I am its consciousness.” 1 Or again, 
“others … copy nature … we are attempting a piece 
of it.”2 
 
Evident here is a certain desire, no doubt an ex-
cruciating one, in which the artist seeks to transcend 
the notion of art as mimesis in order to touch a 
higher reality with paint and canvas. That higher 
reality is the production of art, not as a human activ-
ity by means of propositions and concepts, but 
rather as an organic production of nature itself. 
Building upon Merleau-Ponty’s analysis, this 
essay addresses two related themes. First, a claim is 
made that any production of art is at bottom com-
plicit with the ability of the artist to allow nature to 
flow through him or her, as it were, so that the re-
sulting art object may be considered a product of 
nature. In other words, it is suggested that Cez-
anne’s experience and his goal of producing art-as-
nature is not unique but typical. This claim is not 
new; it is essentially a Kantian understanding of 
genius in general and of the production of fine art in 
particular.3 
 
Second, it is argued that the production of art is 
a phenomenological reality in the following sense. 
The art object is the material residue of a total re-
sponse of the being of the artist as that being is in-
terwoven with the “nature” (to be defined) of the 
cosmos of his or her time. This total response is ap-
perceptive and rooted in the immediate unity be-
tween artist and environment. 
Because total and apperceptive, any accounting 
of this contact as a cognitive engagement (in the 
sense of determinate knowledge) is already a reduc-
tion of the original phenomenological immediacy. 
The center of this total response in the artist is 
called here the phenomenological core of the artist, 
and this essay posits that the production of any fine 
art must necessarily pass through it. 
 
Merleau-Ponty on Cezanne 
“Cezanne’s Doubt” is the first of three essays on art 
written by Merleau-Ponty. These three essays4 serve 
as markers of the philosopher’s early, middle and 
late periods. Each essay shows the growing devel-
opment of the central philosophical theme of Mer-
leau-Ponty’s work: the ontological unity of the hu-
man being’s existence and his or her experience of 
the environment, and this by means of perception. 
For Merleau-Ponty, existence and experience 
do not constitute a duality, as perhaps Descartes 
would have it; the res cogitans does not exist in a 
hermetically sealed realm, deliberating and giving 
definition to the res extensa. Instead, existence and 
experience are one: “… my body is a thing among 
things; it is one of them. It is caught in the fabric of 
the world … the world is made of the very stuff of 
the body...” 5 
Distinct from his early Phenomenology of Per-
ception (1945) and his posthumous The Visible and 
Invisible (1964), both of which offer a general phi-
losophy on the unity of flesh and world via percep-








e as art. 
within which Merleau-Ponty explicitly addresses 
the implications of his theory for the realm of art. 
More specifically, his three essays on art grap-
ple with the implications of this unity for the pro-
duction of the object of art (in lieu, perhaps, of 
merely addressing the experiencing of art objects). 
Merleau-Ponty’s thesis is that the production of art, 
if it is to be art, is necessarily a manifestation of the 
unity of existence with experience: the art object is 
what comes out of that unity, perhaps what erupts 
out of that unity. This notion of eruption will be ex-
plained shortly. 
 It is in this light that we must understand Mer-
leau-Ponty’s interest in Cezanne. He does not intend 
to set Cezanne up as an unusual exception to the 
general case of how art objects are produced. 
To read the first essay’s summary of how 
strange Cezanne was in his personal behavior 
merely in this way (that is, as an unusual exception 
to the general case of how art is produced) would be 
to miss the point that Cezanne’s behavior, indeed 
his whole life, constitute an example, an instantia-
tion, of the kind of convolutions those preoccupied 
with the production of true art all go through. 
Cezanne is given as an example of a larger the-
sis, which is that the production of art entails a 
striving of nature to find expression in material 
forms. The artist that makes this possible merely 
serves as the conduit, as it were, through which this 
organic production passes. He or she may suffer be-
havioral or lifestyle challenges that others could 
count as odd, in order for the “birthing” of the work 
of art to take place. 
 This usage of Cezanne not as an exception to a 
rule but rather as an exemplar of the typical case is 
buttressed by the lengthy digression into the life of 
Leonardo da Vinci at the end of “Cezanne’s 
Doubt.”6 That is, the passages on da Vinci consti-
tute no digression at all; Merleau-Ponty is merely 
offering another example of the typical case. Of 
course, Cezanne and da Vinci do not have identical 
life experiences. And we are told that every expres-
sion of nature through an artist is an unique expres-
sion made possible precisely by that artist and no 
other.7 And from this position emerges a key to 
Merleau-Ponty’s profound understanding of what 
“nature” means in the production of natur
 What he means is this: “nature” is more than 
just the physical furniture of trees, mountains, sky, 
vegetation, and so on. “Nature” includes the artist as 
a piece of nature; the artist is one with the furniture 
of the cosmos in a primordial way.8 This is the first 
sense of what Merleau-Ponty means by “nature.” 
The second is this (and this point is reinforced 
by the da Vinci example): nature is also what and 
how the passage of time has made that artist. It is a 
reading of history as a process of nature; not history 
in some grand globalized sense, as Hegelian ideal-
ism would have it, but rather history in terms of the 
intimate but perhaps seemingly unrelated details of 
the artist’s life through time—all of which contrib-
ute to the emergence of the object of art in some 
way. 
And so da Vinci’s childhood, the attack by the 
vulture in his crib, his abandonment by his father, 
his obsequious devotion to his mother, and so on, all 
become the stuff of “nature” that emerges in his art. 
 
Kant’s Contribution 
What Kant contributes to this idea of the art object 
emerging from the artist as a product of nature is 
found in his analysis of genius and fine art in the 
Critique of Judgment. Simply put, Kant provides a 
means by which to understand how the production 
of art-as-nature comes about, something that Mer-
leau-Ponty does not in fact explain. 
Kant’s “critical philosophy,” of which the Cri-
tique of Judgment is a part, assesses how theoretical 
knowledge, moral determinations, and aesthetic 
preferences are all possible in human experience. It 
gives us a glimpse—at least as Kant sees it—of the 
internal human cognitive faculties and their various 
operations that bring about the different modes of 
human cognition and judgment (theoretical, moral 
and aesthetic).  
First, Kant holds that aesthetic pleasure ensues 
in human experience when the human cognitive 
faculties are in play.9 This is when the faculties, 
chief among them the imagination, senses that the 
order of an external display10 is in harmony with 
the orderly nature of the internal faculties (which 
include the faculties of understanding, of sensibility, 
of the moral realm, and of course, of the imagina-
tion). Kant regards this harmony between the inter-
11





nal human faculties and the external display as “the 
whole of nature regarded as a system that includes 
man as a member...”11 There is a resonance between 
this derivation and Merleau-Ponty’s theory of the 
unity of flesh and world. 
Aesthetic play occurs because, rather than only 
the faculty of understanding arriving upon a fact-of-
the-case determination (e.g., “this is a butterfly”), 
the sensed external display (the butterfly) is also 
presented to the faculty of imagination,12 and an 
aesthetic judgment (“this is a beautiful butterfly”) 
ensues. The play of the faculties, an essentially in-
determinate reality, emerges from this, and aesthetic 
pleasure is the result. 
 Second, Kant holds that, during the play of the 
faculties, due to the “purposive momentum” of that 
play, aesthetic ideas13 emerge in the faculty of 
imagination. These, along with rational ideas,14 
contribute to the imagination’s tremendously pow-
erful creative ability.15 Indeed, Kant says that the 
imagination “... is very powerful in the creation of 
another nature, as it were, out of the material that 
actual nature gives to it.”16
The end result is the production of the work of 
art, which, even though the object itself was pro-
duced by the artist with “a determinate intention,” 
the thing looks like a production of nature, because 
the faculties are able to overlook the propositional 
aspect of its creation. 17 
 Now, Kant defines genius as “the innate mental 
predisposition ... through which nature gives the 
rule to art.”18 The “rule” cannot come from the art 
object itself, in which case art production would 
merely be a process of copying. Nor can it come 
from the artist only, in which case art would be 
purely a determinate composition. 
Kant therefore says that “... it must be nature in 
the subject that gives the rule to art ...”19 This is 
how works of art differ from scientific discoveries. 
For example, once the genius of a Newton discovers 
certain scientific principles, those principles become 
rules which could be used again and again by oth-
ers, independent of Newton. 
But the skill of the artistic genius cannot be 
communicated; rather, it “dies with him, until some 
day nature again endows someone else in the same 
way ...”20 Art objects, then, could never be held as 
standards of imitation by others wishing also to 
produce art. The apprentice could only look to the 
master’s works as models, hoping that “nature has 
provided [him] with a similar proportion in his men-
tal powers”21 to produce original expressions of 
genius. 
 
The Phenomenological Core 
This paper now posits the phenomenological core as 
the technical term that describes the locus within the 
artist through which nature passes in the production 
of objects of art from that artist. This notion draws 
material from both Merleau-Ponty, in his specific 
examples of Cezanne and da Vinci, and Kant, in his 
general observations on nature’s role in the produc-
tion of any fine art, to formulate a single explana-
tory schema. 
For his part, Merleau-Ponty cites Cezanne’s 
prescient statements as to what his goals in painting 
were (e.g., “we are attempting a piece of nature,” 
etc.) without explicitly explaining how this process 
happens. On the other hand, Kant, as it were, opens 
up to view the “black box” in which that precise 
process takes place within the artist, but is perhaps a 
little weak on offering examples.22  
 The term “phenomenological core” emphasizes 
the essentially phenomenological character of the 
production of art. By “phenomenological” is meant 
the pre-cognitive reality of the artist’s immediate 
engagement with his or her surrounds. This includes 
the percolations of aesthetic and rational ideas 
within the artist (and Kant situates the origins of 
both kinds of ideas in regions beyond the reach of 
cognitive determination)23 that contribute to the 
production of objects of art from that artist. 
That the art object is phenomenological may be 
understood in the sense that it is possible to over-
look in it the processes of determinate reason; in 
other words, that it is able to communicate some of 
that primordial natural character of the sources 
from which it came.24  
 But “phenomenological” also includes the real-
ity of how the artist’s past, in terms of his or her 
personal history through time, has uniquely defined 
that artist’s ability to create art. This refers back to 
Merleau-Ponty’s thesis, that even though the art ob-
ject is a production of nature, nature still requires 
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this particular artist to produce art in just this par-
ticular way.25 
Why is this? Again, on Kant’s explanation, aes-
thetic ideas are the result of the purposive momen-
tum that is generated during aesthetic pleasure, 
which is in turn the result of the mental faculties in 
harmonious play. What this tells us is that the em-
pirical concepts that reside in the faculty of under-
standing26—that faculty so essential to determinate 
judgments—are nevertheless included during the 
indeterminate play of the faculties in aesthetic 
pleasure. This results in unique expressions of “na-
ture” as the art object emerges. 
In other words, “nature,” as it works its way 
through the artist, includes the impressions of the 
events of what Merleau-Ponty calls the artist’s “se-
cret history”27 as part of its trajectory. And so da 
Vinci’s childhood experience with the vulture in his 
crib becomes a fact of nature, as it were, in his par-
ticular case that is instantiated in the work Saint 
Anne, the Virgin and Child.28 
 Finally, the phenomenological core is apper-
ceptive in the Kantian sense. This is a term that 
Merleau-Ponty picks up on when he cites Cezanne: 
“… art is a personal apperception, which I embody 
in sensations and which I ask the understanding to 
organize into a painting.”29 Again, Cezanne’s in-
sight is clear: apperception is a priori to the under-
standing’s task of “organizing” a painting.  
What is apperception? For Kant, it is the ability 
of the mental faculties to unify all external appear-
ances into a single reality. It is the “original un-
changeable consciousness” that “precedes all ex-
perience, and … makes experience possible.”30 And 
it is just because the constitution of the human fac-
ulties are able to give apperceptive unity to external 
displays, without cognitively deciding to do so, that 
we could say that apperceptive ability is the most 
primordial connection between the human being 
and nature. 
This is why Cezanne wished to “forget all he 
had ever learned from science…”31 in order to be 
able to create his pieces of nature; he wanted to re-
turn to the primordial natural reality, via appercep-
tion, prior to any cognitive determinations. 
 The phenomenological core proposed here, 
then, groups all the above considerations into one 
conceptual schema for the purposes of focusing the 
discussion on the production of art that both Mer-
leau-Ponty and Kant brings to us, each in his own 
way. Art emerges from the artist via that artist’s 
phenomenological core. 
And this emergence from the phenomenologi-
cal core represents the totality of the artist’s being, 
insofar as the production of art from that artist’s be-
ing is concerned. The apperceptive unity of all that 
the artist is in terms of empirical concepts accrued 
over time, the artist’s “secret history,” the play of all 
of the faculties, the aesthetic ideas of the imagina-
tion, and so on, all contribute to an eruption that 
results, mysteriously, powerfully, incomprehensibly, 
in a work of art. 
 
Art as Eruption 
But still, why the eruption? Given all that the men-
tal faculties undergo in terms of aesthetic pleasure, 
why does anything need to be materially expressed? 
Why could not the artist merely enjoy the pleasure 
within her as something of a secret and closeted joy 
just for herself? Why must the pleasure result in a 
public work, put forth, launched, erupted, out of her 
being, ultimately going on to have a history of its 
own, independent of her?  
There are two answers for this, one rooted in 
the nature of the internal human faculties, the other 
rooted in nature as such. As to the internal faculties, 
Kant tells us that it is their fundamental nature to 
reach to ever larger realms of comprehension and 
experience.32 
In short, human reason33 is motivated to know 
and to expand in knowledge beyond the bounds of 
any current state it happens to be in. Insofar as this 
necessity to expand is concerned, it is as a priori as 
any formulation within the Kantian system. 
Human history is replete with examples of 
great leaps forward in the expansion of the human 
faculties’ command of experience: consider Ein-
stein’s relativity theory or da Vinci’s Mona Lisa. 
These two examples illustrate that, at these frontiers 
of reason, scientific and aesthetic boundaries tend to 
become blurred and vague, even though the ideas of 
the former are perhaps rooted in the faculty of un-
derstanding, while that of the latter are rooted in the 
imagination.  
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The eruption of art is part and parcel of this lar-
ger motivation of the human faculties to increase its 
scope of knowledge and experience. It is necessarily 
an attempt to communicate meaning, and not just to 
privately revel in it. Perhaps, if we are to follow 
Wittgenstein, it is even doubtful that a purely pri-
vate meaning is even possible. Communication and 
the urge to communicate are all consuming. 
The second answer for the necessary eruption 
of art is just the teeming life of nature itself. Kant 
notes that nature is not only orderly as a system, but 
it also has a purpose which is expressed as a forma-
tive force: 
 
“… a machine has only motive force. But an organized being 
has within it formative force, and a formative force that this 
being imparts to the kinds of matter that lack it (thereby orga-
nizing them). This force is therefore a formative force that 
propagates itself—a force that a mere ability of one thing to 
move another (i.e. as mechanism) cannot explain…”34 
 
What Kant is saying is that the organic beings 
of nature, chief among them the human being, do 
not only exist in and as nature; they also have an 
ability to produce nature as part and parcel of their 
existence. In short, trees grow, birds hatch, humans 
produce art. It is an amazing thing to note that every 
human culture produces art as an unreflective ne-
cessity of its existence. Objects of art are always 
already there, as evidence of the fact of human exis-
tence in the cosmos.  
The phenomenological core, then, is a single 
conceptual schema that intersects all of the Kantian 
faculties but is not resident exclusively in any one 
of them. It is a name given to the total sum of the 
set of factors, resident within the human subject, 
that contribute towards the emergence of a work of 
art from the being of the artist. It is through the 
phenomenological core that nature works to find 
expression in art. 
 
A Phenomenological Bridge 
The irony must be noted in this coupling of Mer-
leau-Ponty’s analysis of Cezanne and da Vinci with 
Kant’s aesthetic theory. Kant’s aesthetic theory re-
sides in that larger system which he has called the 
critical philosophy. This system posits the well-
known Kantian position that the “thing-in-itself” is 
not knowable. We could only know appearances of 
things because, by the time the sensed display is 
“cognized,” our faculties have already processed it. 
Hence the original “thing-in-itself” is forever 
veiled. On the other hand, Merleau-Ponty’s goal 
was nothing but a description of how nature is able 
to produce the original expression of art as a 
“piece” of itself, and how the artist (e.g., a Cezanne 
or a da Vinci) is able to access those mysterious 
powers for the purposes of realizing this production. 
How could these two factors be rectified? 
Two responses could be made. The first is the 
frank assessment that Kant himself became less 
strict on the impossibility of knowing the “thing-in-
itself” as his thinking evolved from the first Cri-
tique to the third. This is not to say that he ever re-
canted on this claim; but it is to say that the third 
Critique is filled with deference to the need for the 
supersensible to undergird any possibility of coher-
ence in the realm of the knowable.35  
 The second is this: for Kant, the realm of the 
production of art is precisely where a connection 
with the supersensible becomes necessary if a for-
mulation for its possibility (that is, for the possibil-
ity of the production of art) is to be proposed. In 
other words, for Kant, the production of art is a 
phenomenological reality in the sense that Merleau-
Ponty would have it: it is a process that is dependent 
upon a pre-cognitive reality. 
 Kant’s words on this, unfortunately dense, nev-
ertheless convey his point. For example, he speaks 
of the harmony between the external display and the 
internal faculties as experienced “a priori rather 
than empirically.” He goes on: when an artist pro-
duces a figure… “[s/he] introduces the purposive-
ness into the figure… into [her] own way of pre-
senting something that is given…, whatever it may 
be in itself.” The artist “needs no special purpose 
outside [of her] in the object to account for that pur-
posive harmony…” And the end effect of “the pres-
entation”—that is, the produced object—is admira-
tion: “an entirely natural effect of that purposive-
ness observed in the nature of things as appear-
ances…36  
 The art object may indeed still be accessed only 
as appearance, but that appearance has the indeter-
minate look of the supersensible to it. In this way, 
the art object may be regarded as a bridge between 
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the determinate realm and the indeterminate, per-
haps even the noumenal, realm. 
 What Kant means to say in all of this, then, is 
simply that his aesthetic theory could account for art 
as a production of nature through the being of the 
artist. Even though the end result is still an appear-
ance of the art object, it is nevertheless entirely a 
natural effect because it was entirely a natural proc-
ess. And that is why we admire works of art.37 
The point is that the process bypasses, or at 
least trumps, any primary dependence upon cogni-
tive reductions in the understanding only. Instead, it 
is able to harness the connections to the supersensi-
ble deep within the human faculties. 
What Merleau-Ponty clarifies by giving us the 
examples of Cezanne and da Vinci is that this con-
nection to the supersensible is synonymous with a 
connection to nature. And so the artist strives to be 
“nature’s consciousness,” and the end product of 
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